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a b s t r a c t
We present second steps in the construction of formal models of NAND flash memory,
based on a recently emerged open standard for such devices. The model is intended as
a key part of a pilot project to develop a verified file store system based on flash memory.
The projectwas proposed by Joshi andHolzmann as a contribution to theGrand Challenge in
Verified Software, and involves constructing a highly assured flash file store for use in space-
flight missions. Themodel is at a level of abstraction that captures the internal architecture
of NAND flash devices. In this paper, we focus on mechanising the state model and its
initialisation operation, where most of the conceptual complexity resides.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The ‘‘Grand Challenge in Computing’’ [10] (GC) on Verified Software [28], has a stream focusing on mission-critical file
stores, such as may be required for space-probe missions [13]. Of particular interest are file stores based on the relatively
recentNAND flashmemory technology, nowvery popular in portable data storage devices such asMP3players and datakeys.
Flash memory is seen as ideal for these kinds of missions as it has good physical handling properties, being non-volatile,
shock-resistant and capable of operating under a wide range of pressures and temperatures. It also has the very valuable
property, for space-borne vehicles, of having no moving, and in particular, no rotating parts.
The data in flash memory is structured into pages that are then grouped into blocks, generally with some higher levels
of grouping in addition. There are two types of flash memory: (i) NOR flash memory, which can be programmed (written)
at byte level, but must be erased at block level, is relatively slow, but suits random access; and (ii) NAND flash memory with
higher speed, where programming must be done at the page level, making it a sequential access device. The former suits
non-volatile core-memory, whilst the latter is suited to implementing data-stores and file-systems.
This paper is a follow-up to [4], which described an initial formal model of NAND flash memory, based on the recently
released specification from the ‘‘Open NAND Flash Interface (ONFI)’’ consortium [11]. That paper focused on the structural
aspects of the devices, i.e., their internal organisation, and an abstract view of the behaviour of those operations deemed
mandatory by the standard. The model presented, using the Z notation [27,29], was hand-crafted, and intended for human
consumption.
The Posix file store pilot project ismore complex than the first pilot project, the correctness of theMondex smart card [30].
The top-level specification is rather larger, and the amount of code will be much greater (Mondex has been implemented
using about 700 lines of JavaCard code). Flash memory is just one component in the Posix project. The others include the
Posix interface itself, the refinement through several layers to programming data structures, principally hash maps and
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search trees, and the memory infrastructure, including device drivers, the flash translation layer, and the model of flash
memory itself. The flash memory model is at least as complex as the Mondex problem.
Nevertheless, a key goal of the grand challenge in verification is to develop a repository of mechanically verified software
and hardware, and so to this end we proceeded to mechanise the model, using the Z/Eves theorem prover [24]. This paper
describes part of the mechanised model, placing emphasis on how the model had to be elaborated in order to facilitate
mechanisation. Herewedescribe the reformulation of the schemas describing these devices aswell as the process ofmarking
defective blocks in the device.
It should also be noted that themodel presented in this paper is not an abstract specification of a system to be developed,
with a view to avoiding ‘‘implementation bias’’, in order to allow a developer freedom to seek the best solution. Instead, we
are modelling an existing artefact (the ONFI specification), and the real devices that already exist or that are likely to come
into existence in the near future. As a consequence there will be clear examples of implementation bias in this model.
This is the first work on modelling flash memory, to the extent of our knowledge. The file system is implemented using
the interface to flash memory. A formal model of flash memory is required to give semantics to this interface. For example,
the correctness of flash memory device drivers relies on a precise understanding of how the memory actually works. There
aremanydifferent algorithmsused tomanage flashmemory, including itsmandatory command set,workload-related aging,
wear-levelling algorithms, and memory reclamation (garbage collection). Some of the algorithms involved are intricate and
their correctness is not obvious. This is the first step in constructing a more general domain model of memory hardware,
including new technologies, such as multi-layer flash and phase-change memory.
We briefly describe related work in Section 2, and then in Section 4 we describe the internal organisation of NAND flash
devices, while in Section 5 we discuss the modelling of the initial state of these devices. We finish with a discussion of the
future progression of this work in Section 6.
2. Related work
There has been a considerable body ofwork done on formalmodels of file systems, and the technical, usage and reliability
aspects of NAND flash devices, but there is little published work on the formal modelling of NAND flash devices at present.
Of recent interest, however, is the application of model-checking techniques to Flash memory design [16] in collaboration
with Samsung, one of the world’s largest flash memory manufacturers. This looked at verifying a device-driver operation,
using model-checking on a model of a small flash device, and following this up with tests on a large real flash device. A key
point made in [16] is that testing was proving totally inadequate as a verification technique for their software and it was
only the introduction of model-checking techniques that allowed the project to complete satisfactorily.
There has been a considerable body ofwork done on formalmodels of file systems, and the technical, usage and reliability
aspects of NAND flash devices.
Formal aspects of file systems have covered specifications [22,20,9,23] and approaches towards their verification [3].
Some recent work has also looked at applying model-checking techniques to entire file systems [32], with considerable
success. The DAISY file system, implemented in about 1200 lines of Java, was used in 2004 as a case-study for a special
joint CAV/ISSTA event [7]. Intermediate findings on using Promela/SPIN and Petri-Net/SMART to check part of the Linux file
system is reported as a technical report [1]. At another extreme, a exercise applying software model-checking to an entire
Linux distribution [25] uncovered 108 exploitable bugs, of which 97 were associated with file system vulnerabilities.
There has been a wide range of material published regarding the implementation of file systems on NAND flashmemory,
most of which utilise some form of log-structuring [15,31,18,12,17]. Of interest to a potential space-borne application are
techniques that use NAND flash to implement low-power file caches for mobile devices [19,14]. A key feature of these
schemes is the need to cope with the accumulation of errors over time, a mechanism which is very well understood [2,26].
3. Z/Eves
The choice of Z for the Posix interface wasmade for legacy reasons, as the original Morgan & Sufrin specification [22] was
in Z. It seemed most straightforward to stay in one language so as to avoid a semantic gap, leaving a choice of either Z/Eves
[24] or ProofPower-Z as a theorem prover. Given the experience in using Z/Eves, this was adopted for tool-support.
We give a brief overview of the Z/Eves theorem prover [24]. The prover works on a goal predicate, which is transformed
by proof commands into a logically equivalent goal — hence it effectively supports equational reasoning. This has an impact
on how witnesses are used, so for example, let w be a witness for goal G = ∃ x • P(x), then applying this witness results in
the new goal P(w) ∨ ∃ x • P(x), rather than just P(w).
Z-Eves applies a high degree of automation in many of its proof steps, usually exploiting various rewrite and reduction
techniques, driven by a database of rules. These commands traverse the goal, left-to-right, top-to-bottom, and either
transform sub-parts, or extends a context contain predicates that can be assumed true (e.g. goal P ⇒ Q will transform
to context P and goal Q ).
The rules come from a variety of sources, most notably toolkit libraries suppliedwith the tool, and from theorems posited
and proved by the users themselves. A variety of mechanisms are provided to give the user control over rule usage:
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Rule enabling/disabling. Theorems and predicates in schemas can be labelled as named rules (keyword rule), and marked
if so desired as disabled. An enabled rule is applied automatically, if applicable, by the various automation steps,
whereas the use of a disabled rule has to be explicitly invoked by the user.
Assumption rules. Any rule of a certain form, containing a trigger, can be labelled with the keyword grule. If a trigger is
encountered, the rule, or a suitably modified form of it, is added to the context, or applied to the trigger.
Forward rules. An theorem whose form is an implication (P ⇒ Q ) can be designated a forward rule, using the frule
keyword. If predicate P is added to the context, this triggers the rule, which also extends the context with Q .
For further details, see the Z/Eves Reference Manual [21]. In Z paragraphs, we can add rule annotations as special
‘‘comments’’, (e.g. 〈〈disabled rule dDataElems 〉〉 ).
4. Flash memory structure
In this section we present the various layers representing the way NAND flash devices are organised. At the top
level, a NAND flash chip, or Device, is composed of a number (1–4) of independent cores, each with their own off-chip
communication facilities, called Targets. Within a target, there are a number (1–4) of Logical Units (LUNs) which can process
commands concurrently, but which share communication links with the outside world (see Fig. 3).
The memory inside a LUN is arranged as a large number (1024–4096) of Blocks, each of which is itself a number (32–96)
of Pages. In addition, a LUN contains a special page called the Page Register (PR), used as a staging post for data transfers, and
a single-byte Status Register (SR), used to report progress and failure of memory operations (see Fig. 2).
A page is an array of Bytes, conceptually split into two parts: the main page whose size is a power of 2 (1024, 2048), plus
a spare part typically 16–64 bytes in length (see Fig. 1). The purpose of the spare section is to facilitate error detection and
correction, as well as to play a role in marking defective blocks.
We now present the Z model of this structure, working from the bottom level upwards.
4.1. Data unit
The basic data unit in a flashmemory is either a Byte (8 bits), or aWord (16 bits), depending on the type of device.We are
going to abstract away from this detail, and assume a given type called Data that denotes the basic information unit. From
previous experience in modularising operations in schemas (i.e., the Mondex case-study [30]), we need witnesses in order
to discharge existence proofs, and the ONFI model requires at least two distinguishable Data values zeroed and erased. To
this end we introduce a given set Datum, where Data is defined as its non-empty subset, with the added invariant on Data,
required later on, that at least two elements exist:
[Datum]
Data : P1 Datum
〈〈disabled dDataElems 〉〉 ∃ d1, d2 : Data • d1 6= d2
We add a type weakening lemma indicating that elements of Data are actually Datum. This is important to increase proof
automation and avoid problems with Z’s maximal type inference.
theorem grule gDataIsDatum (§B)
d ∈ Data⇒ d ∈ Datum
The Z/Eves keyword grule is used here to indicate that this is to be used as an assumption rule, so any addition to a proof
context asserting membership in Data also adds a context assumption regarding Datum membership. The notation (§B)
indicates that the proof is to be found in Appendix B.
4.2. Modelling memory structure
The structure of an ONFI-compliant NAND flash device has five levels of hierarchy, but we cannot abstract away from
details of this hierarchy because each level captures some boundary of possible behaviour, with implications for how various
operations can be interleaved.
A flattened structure, as presented in the ONFI standard, would be quite complex to reason about, therefore, we have
chosen to use promotion [29, Chp 13]. This gives benefits in the separation of concerns within the proof effort required
for operations, particularly the precondition calculations. Also, as many operations over the memory space affect different
entities (i.e., operations over pages, blocks, or logical units), it seems a quite natural choice for promotion. A beneficial side-
effect is that the specification becomes easier to follow and read.
In most cases, the promotion is relatively trivial, as each layer of the state component has nothing else but the part to be
promoted, and hence there is no need to promote to a schema binding [29, p152]. Nevertheless, an interesting discoverywas
that, although the operations are suitable for promotion, one of them requires quite an elaborate definition. In Z, promotion
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Fig. 1. NAND flash structure (bottom levels).
is usually defined when local operations are used pointwise within some global state. Due to the heterogeneous nature of
one flash memory operation, we have to define what we call bulk promotion. That is, we promote local state changes (e.g.,
at page, block, logical unit, and target levels) into the global flash device at multiple addresses (e.g., all ‘‘bad’’ and all ‘‘good’’
addresses) at once. To the extent of our knowledge, this kind of use of promotion in Z is new.
4.2.1. Pages
A page is an array of data items, consisting of a main page, plus some ‘‘spare’’ locations. (Fig. 1). This is the basic unit
for writing, or programming. The spare locations are designed to assist with error detection and correction. The page size
(pageCount) must be a power of two,1 and the column address bits (colAddrSize) must be sufficient to address both the main
page as well as the spare area. The page count is not a global constant, but is in fact part of the (fixed) state of an ONFI device
that characterises it.
In Z/Eves we first have to define a function power for integer exponentiation, and prove some consistency theorems
about the existence of integers related by this function in various ways, as well as useful rewriting rules. Function power is
defined inductively on the size of the exponent, andwe omit it here. Full details about themodel and the proofs can be found
in [5]. We can then capture the relationships between page and spare sizes, and the number of bits required to address them
in a Z axiomatic definition.
pageAddrSize, colAddrSize, pageCount, spare : N1
〈〈disabled rule dPageCount 〉〉 pageCount = power (2, pageAddrSize)
〈〈disabled rule dSpareRange 〉〉 pageCount + spare ≤ power (2, colAddrSize)
These rules are marked as disabled to prevent them being applied automatically by the Z/Eves prover, and so have to be
explicitly invoked if required. In Z, axiomatic definitions may introduce inconsistencies, and these contradictory axioms
may lead to proofs of other inconsistent properties. To avoid this, it is good practice to add consistency theorems for all
axiomatic definitions. For instance, before introducing an axiomatic definition, one needs to prove an existential conjecture
about the axiom being introduced. If the conjecture is proved, then the axiom is consistent with respect to the preceding
specification.
We want to define an axiom on column addresses to represent the addressable space of a page. For this, first we prove
an existential conjecture ensuring that column addresses are not empty. This is possible by the definition of the constants
above, since they represent strictly positive natural numbers.
theorem tColAddrConsistency (§B)
∃ ca : F1 N • ca = 0 . . pageCount + spare− 1
We can now give an axiomatic definition of the (finite) set of all column addresses:
colAddr : F1 N
〈〈disabled rule dColAddr 〉〉 colAddr = 0 . . pageCount + spare− 1
As before for Data, to aid with automation, it helps to prove that the column address maximal type is Z:
theorem grule gColAddrMaxType (§B)
x ∈ colAddr ⇒ x ∈ Z
This makes it easier, for instance, to reason about the use of power , defined on Z, when applied to values of type colAddr .
Now, we define addressable data as a total function from column addresses to data:
AddrData == colAddr → Data
Finally,we define a Page as containing addressable data ranging over the available column addressing space.Weuse schemas
since schema bindings are easier to automate than the usual cross products of various addressing spaces, as used in the
original published model [4].
Page =̂ [ info : AddrData ]
1 Memory page sizes are traditionally always a power of two, as this optimises the use of the address bits, whose range is always a power of two.
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Fig. 2. NAND flash structure (middle levels).
At this point we have defined a page as a mapping from column addresses to data items. Similarly, we also have to define a
block as a mapping from page addresses to pages, a logical unit (LUN) as having a mapping from block addresses to blocks,
a target as having a mapping from LUN addresses to LUNs, and finally (!) a device as a mapping from target identifiers to
targets. In each case the relationships between addresses and entities has to be set up with the sequence of axioms and
consistency theorems shown above. In the sequel we do not describe all of this but simply concentrate on the parts of Z
that differ at the various levels of hierarchy. The complete details, together with proof scripts are available as a technical
report [6].
4.2.2. Blocks
A block is a collection of pages, and is the smallest unit to which an erase operation can be applied. The number of pages
per block is constrained to a multiple of 32.
pagesPerBlock : N1
pageAddr : F1 N
〈〈disabled dPagesPerBlock 〉〉 ∃ n : N1 • pagesPerBlock = 32 ∗ n
〈〈disabled rule dPageAddr 〉〉 pageAddr = 0 . . pagesPerBlock− 1
AddrPage == pageAddr → AddrData
Block =̂ [ pages : AddrPage ]
Similarly to Page, Block is given as a schema with a function on the appropriate addressable space.
4.2.3. Logical units
A logical unit (LUN) is the smallest sub-entity within a device that is capable of operating independently. It comprises
a collection of blocks, along with at least one page-register and a status register. The page-registers are used as temporary
locations while data is being transferred to and from the LUN. (see Fig. 2). For present purposes we assume a single page-
register, as ONFI is not specific on this issue [11, p. 21].
The status register has 8 bits, of which 5 bits currently have defined meanings. Two of these (FAILC, ARDY) are out of the
scope of the current model leaving the following three to be considered: FAIL, set if a program or erase operation failed; RDY,
set when the LUN is ready to perform a command; andWP, the write-protect flag. Note that the FAIL flag is only valid when
RDY is being asserted, while WP is always valid.
Flag ::= fail | ready | writeProtected
Status == P Flag
validStatus == { s : Status | fail ∈ s⇒ ready ∈ s}
The power-up status is that the device is not ready and is write-protected. Once reset (as a result of either power-up or the
reset command) is complete, then the status becomes ready and write-protected.
We model LUNs as follows:
blocksPerLUN : N1
blockAddr : F1 N
〈〈disabled rule dBlockAddr 〉〉 blockAddr = 0 . . blocksPerLUN − 1
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Fig. 3. NAND flash structure (upper levels).
AddrBlock == blockAddr → AddrPage
LUN =̂ [ blocks : AddrBlock; SR : Status; PR : Page ]
LUNs are addressable blocks together with the extra page register and status flag.
4.2.4. Targets
A target, within a device, is the smallest unit that can communicate independently off-chip. It is made up of one or more
logical units.
LUNsPerTarget : N1
lunAddr : F1 N
〈〈disabled rule dLunAddr 〉〉 lunAddr = 0 . . LUNsPerTarget − 1
AddrLUN == lunAddr → LUN
Target =̂ [ luns : AddrLUN ]
We then view a Target as a map from LUN addresses to LUNs.
4.2.5. Flash devices
A device (single NAND flash chip) encapsulates a number of targets, numbered from 1 upwards. Devices are supplied
with a guarantee from the manufacturer regarding an upper bound on the number of bad blocks present. We capture this
guarantee as the natural numbermaxBadBlocksShipped.
targetsPerDevice : N1
targetIds : F1 N
〈〈disabled rule dTargetIds 〉〉 targetIds = 1 . . targetsPerDevice
IdTarget == targetIds→ AddrLUN
NANDFlashDevice
targets : IdTarget;
maxBadBlocksShipped : N
badBlocks : targetIds↔ (lunAddr × blockAddr)
badBlocks ∈ F (Z× (Z× Z))
# badBlocks ≤ maxBadBlocksShipped
When a device is being used, the application has to maintain a table of bad block addresses for each LUN within all targets.
The table size is bounded by themaximumnumber of blocks, and hencemust be finite. As described byONFI [11, p. 24], there
are algorithms that detect and create this initial table of bad blocks. We abstract from this step and assume this table will
be given to the defect marking operation defined below (see Section 5.2). When a device is shipped, it contains an internal
representation of the initial state of this table, as the bad blocks are marked as such by the manufacturer.
A. Butterfield et al. / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2009) 219–237 225
4.3. Memory addressing
The address data sent into a device conceptually splits into two parts, the row and column addresses. The column address
corresponds to an index into a page,while the rowaddress identifieswhich page is currently being accessed. The rowaddress
is itself obtained by concatenating the LUN, block and page addresses in that order.We avoid using tuples as this requires the
use of multiple tuple projections when mechanised, so we define equivalent schema representations for the basic address
components, and then use schema conjunction to build up the composite addresses:
ColAddr =̂ [ ca : colAddr ]
PageAddr =̂ [ pa : pageAddr ]
BlockAddr =̂ [ ba : blockAddr ]
LUNAddr =̂ [ la : lunAddr ]
TargetIds =̂ [ tid : targetIds ]
DataAddr =̂ (BlockAddr ∧ PageAddr ∧ ColAddr)
RowAddr =̂ (LUNAddr ∧ BlockAddr ∧ PageAddr)
Address =̂ (RowAddr ∧ DataAddr)
The use of DataAddr in Address rather than the full expanded version as
Address =̂ (RowAddr ∧ (BlockAddr ∧ PageAddr ∧ ColAddr))
is simply to reduce the amount of schema expansion required in the prover — it has no semantic significance.
Proofs involving bulk promotion repeatedly require the proviso of witnesses for certain types of address. Thus, we prove
some theorems about the non-emptiness of these address spaces, and that the mappings from addresses to addressed
entities are total within the specified addressing spaces.
theorem tExistsColAddr (§B)
∃ ca : colAddr • true
theorem frule tBlockPagesAreTotal (§B)
∀ Block • pages ∈ pageAddr → colAddr → Data
Here we also indicate, using frule, that this theorem should be used as a forward proof rule. This means related schemas
do not need to be expanded in order for the prover to infer the fact the theorem establishes. This allows surgical expansion
of specific schemas whilst proving more complicated goals, such as precondition calculation or refinement simulations.
The result of this is that the list of hypotheses are considerably smaller, hence making the whole proof exercise easier to
carry out.
4.4. Promoting memory entities
We detail below how the framing schemas for the promotion at various levels are laid out. These schemas define how
local changes at various levels can bemapped into the global state one ormore levels above. That is, howpages are promoted
into blocks; blocks into LUNs; LUNs into targets; and targets into devices.
The promotion here is quite subtle, yet trivial. It is subtle because it is not like a normal promotionwhere sets of bindings
are identified, as herewe are using promotion to ‘‘un-flatten’’ different addressable spaces. It is trivial because the local states
are simple bindings with one component (except for logical units), so we just project the appropriate element, given the
right address. As available operations affect specific parts of the state, this layered approach proves to be clear and elegant,
yet simple and easy to mechanise. Different concerns are distinctively and modularly separated, whilst proof scripts are
quite trivial for the complexity of the data type.
First, we ‘‘promote’’ data within a page given a column address. Although this is more projection rather than promotion,
bearing in mind our abstraction from Byte andWord as fixed-size sequences of bits into Data. We could replace PhiPDwith
a more concrete (raw) data type.
PhiPD
∆ Page; ColAddr?; d! : Data
info′ = info⊕ { ca? 7→ d! }
We now prove the following as lemmas:
info′ ca? = d!
{ ca? } info′ = { ca? } info
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That is, the data output (d!) at the given column address (ca?) comes from the updated pages (info′), while the data associated
with the remaining column addresses within the page remain unchanged. Next, we do the same for pages within a block
given a page address. As the Page schema only contains one element, we avoid the need to promote into bindings and do it
directly into info′ instead. The before state of Page is linked with the corresponding before state of Block, since the page at
the given address (pa?) within the block pages is pages pa? = info.
PhiBP
∆ Block; ∆ Page; PageAddr?
pages pa? = info
pages′ = pages⊕ { pa? 7→ info′ }
Again, we promote blocks within a logical unit given a block address, and without referring to Block bindings but to pages′
directly.
PhiLB
∆ LUN; ∆ Block; BlockAddr?
blocks ba? = pages
blocks′ = blocks⊕ { ba? 7→ pages′ }
Logical units are promoted within a target given a LUN address. This is the only ‘‘traditional’’ promotion [29, Chp.13] in the
sense that we are mapping lunAddr to LUN bindings. That is the case because logical unit schemas also have status and at
least one page register, instead of just a function addressing the space where the various levels are laid out.
PhiTL
∆ Target; ∆ LUN; LUNAddr?
luns la? = θ LUN
luns′ = luns⊕ { la? 7→ θ LUN ′ }
We now use the schema version of memory addressing to define data operations over a logical unit of a target:
PhiTargetData =̂ (PhiTL ∧ PhiLB ∧ PhiBP ∧ PhiPD ∧ Address?)
That is, given a full Address? as input, which contains column, page, block, LUN, and target addresses, we can perform, in
this case, a page-level operation. Similarly, for operations at other levels, we provide varied versions of conjoined schemas
representing the right framing with corresponding addressing.
4.5. Structure summary
Themodel as presentedmatches very closely the levels of hierarchy described in theONFI specification, and itmay appear
that: (i) this is hierarchy for hierarchy’s sake; and (ii) this is at too low a level for formal modelling. Nevertheless, each step
of the hierarchy captures a distinct change in how the device is accessed and operated, and awareness of these distinctions
is important when developing systems where performance is crucial. The ONFI specification also gives descriptions of finite
state machines (FSMs) that capture the behaviour of targets and LUNs, viewing these as separate machines communicating
with one another. By capturing the target/LUN distinction at this level, we facilitate future work in showing that the FSM
view is a refinement of this one. At the level of this model, the only real complexity is the nesting of the various addressing
spaces and their mechanisation. This is one example of the implementation bias alluded to in the introduction.
5. Device initial state
When shipped from the factory, a device will be completely erased (all logic ‘1’s). The only exception to this is for those
blocks identified as bad at manufacture time. These blocks will have zeros programmed into specific locations of the spare
parts of either their first or last pages. We need to introduce the notion that Data has two distinct values zeroed and erased,
among others.
Here there are three instances of Data, with erased and zeroed being different, and this was why Datawas introduced as
having at least two distinct members. Bad block marking is non-deterministic: either the first or the last page address of a
block is marked. Also, within the chosen page, any column address in the spare area of a page can be marked, but only one
such column address is marked by being zeroed. Therefore, we do not know what the value of the other (not chosen) spare
column addresses are. In our original specification, we assumed non-zero values in this case to be erased, but were unable
to complete the proofs. The inherent assumption that non-zeroed values were in fact erased was too strong, and so we had
to introduce a third possibility, that the value might be arbitrary and unknown (any).
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erased, zeroed, any : Data
〈〈 rule dInitalDataRel 〉〉 ¬ erased = zeroed
Formechanisation, we start bymodelling a devicewith amanufacturer’s quality guarantee (i.e., bad blockmaximum),where
the bad-blocks table is left undefined, as we do not yet know what the table is. Subsequently we define a defect marking
operation that captures the true state of a shipped NAND flash device.
First we initialise a device with a quality guarantee.
NANDFlashDeviceInit
NANDFlashDevice′
quality? : N
maxBadBlocksShipped′ = quality?
We then capture the fact that this guarantee on maximum bad blocks never alters for a given device.
ShippedNANDFlash
∆NANDFlashDevice
maxBadBlocksShipped′ = maxBadBlocksShipped
At this point we can prove precondition theorems for the schemas characterising these defect-free devices.
theorem tNANDFlashDeviceInitPRE (§B)
∀ quality? : N • pre NANDFlashDeviceInit
theorem tShippedNANDFlashPRE (§B)
∀NANDFlashDevice • pre ShippedNANDFlash
Finally, targets are promoted within a shipped device (i.e., those initialised devices with maximum bad blocks set).
PhiDT
ShippedNANDFlash; ∆ Target; tid? : targetIds
targets tid? = luns
targets′ = targets⊕ { tid? 7→ luns′ }
5.1. Precondition proof constants
A precondition calculates the exact set of before-states in which an operation will re-establish the state invariants in
any after-state. This involves a theorem in which the after-state and outputs are existentially quantified, and whose proof
therefore requires witnesses to these existential values. We supply these witnesses as theta and lambda terms that return
particular instances of interesting data structures, layered according to our definitions above.
ANY PAGE INSTANCE == (λ ca : colAddr • any)
ERASED PAGE INSTANCE == (λ ca : colAddr • erased)
ERASED BLOCK INSTANCE == (λ pa : pageAddr • ERASED PAGE INSTANCE)
ERASED LUNBLK INSTANCE == (λ ba : blockAddr •
ERASED BLOCK INSTANCE)
ERASED PR INSTANCE == θPage[info := ERASED PAGE INSTANCE]
ERASED LUN INSTANCE == θLUN[PR := ERASED PR INSTANCE,
SR := { ready },
blocks := ERASED LUNBLK INSTANCE]
ERASED TARGET LUNS INSTANCE == (λ la : lunAddr •
ERASED LUN INSTANCE)
ERASED TARGET INSTANCE == (λ tid : targetIds •
ERASED TARGET LUNS INSTANCE)
The assignments to θ-expressions above are syntactic sugar in Z/Eves for expression (rather than name) substitution
∃ i : AddrData | i = ERASED PAGE INSTANCE • θ Page[i/info]
With these constants, it is now possible to provide witnesses for the specific NAND layers in the various precondition
proofs that follow. These constants are just syntactic sugar for a somewhat larger λ-expression representing, say, erased
addressable targets (i.e., all LUNS within it are erased, which leads to all blocks and pages to be erased as well).
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5.2. Defect marking
The flashmemorymanufacturing process is not perfect, and so virtually every device shipped will have some bad blocks.
Themanufacturer tests each device andmarks the bad blocks bywriting zeros into key locationswithin the defective blocks.
All the good blocks are erased (contents set to all ones).
Wemodel this bad blockmarking as the operationNANDFlashMarkwhose input is a set of bad block addresses, andwhose
result is a NAND flash device with those blocks marked as defective, and the complementary blocks marked as erased. This
heterogeneous nature of the operation, togetherwith the fact that it updates different parts of the (layered/promoted) states
at many points (in bulk) makes this a rather complex operation overall.
Let us first initialise the smallest addressable space: a Page. It is defined by the next four schemas below.
5.2.1. Marking data within a page
At first, we define a schema used as the signature for the declaration of the Page marking operations. This is a useful
separation of concerns in case we need to change this signature in the future due to changing requirements. That is, in
case of a change in the operation signature, only one place needs to be changed, and hence both the definition of further
operations and the related proof scripts will be less affected.
PageMarkOp =̂ [∆ Page ]
Usable pages are all those with their addressable space erased.
PageMarkErased
PageMarkOp
∀ ColAddr • info′ ca = erased
The bulk promotion is clearly visible in the universal quantifier above.When one needs to prove the precondition of such an
operation, this universal quantifier appears within the existential quantifier of the precondition theorem which becomes a
hindrance within the proof, which in itself is quite complex. Thanks to the way the constants above were layered, and the
fact that automation for λ-expressions is quite high, the (initially intractable) proof becomes much more amenable.
Bad pages are those with at least one zeroed data in its spare area (i.e., the column address beyond pageCount). Also, it
must be a specific page within a block (i.e., either first or last).
Again to separate concerns, and make defining predicates and related theorems more readable, we add constants that
pinpoint what the domains are for bad column addresses within a page, and page addresses within a block.
BAD COLADDR DOMAIN == { bca : colAddr | bca ≥ pageCount }
FIRST PAGEADDR == 0
BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN == { bpa : pageAddr | bpa = FIRST PAGEADDR ∨
bpa = pagesPerBlock− 1 }
Rules like the ones below are crucial in order to allow automatic proof without expanding the definitions, when
abbreviations like the above are used.
theorem grule gBadColAddrDomainMaxType (§B)
BAD COLADDR DOMAIN ∈ PZ
theorem rule rBadColAddrDomainElem (§B)
x ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN ⇒ x ≥ pageCount
We need weakening rules to keep BAD XXXADDR DOMAIN disabled without affecting further proofs, e.g.:
theorem rule rBadColAddrDomainIsColAddr (§B)
x ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN ⇒ x ∈ colAddr
It is important that bad addressable domains are not empty, otherwise, it is impossible to mark a particular page as bad, so
we prove witness theorems, for example, such as:
theorem rule lPageCountInBadColAddrDomain (§B)
pageCount ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN
theorem grule gFirstPageAddrMaxType (§B)
FIRST PAGEADDR ∈ Z
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theorem rule lBadPageAddrDomainElem (§B)
FIRST PAGEADDR ∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN
We also state some general theorems, useful in precondition proofs of each stage where we need to provide witnesses, such
as:
theorem tExistsBadColAddr (§B)
∃ ColAddr • ca ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN
theorem tExistsBadPageAddr (§B)
∃ PageAddr • pa ∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN
As the first and last pages of a block are where defect marking is done, we actually need a theorem that deals with the
pathological case of a block that has only two pages:
theorem tPageAddrDomainBounds (§B)
if (pagesPerBlock > 2) then
(∃ PageAddr • pa /∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN)
else
pageAddr = BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN
We can now characterise a marked bad page:
PageMarkBad
PageMarkOp
∃ ColAddr | ca ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN • info′ ca = zeroed
In order to determine which pages get marked as bad we need a more global view, namely that of the bad blocks within
a given LUN. Nevertheless, with the assistance of about six theorems and three further abbreviations, we can prove the
precondition:
theorem tPageMarkBadPRE (§B)
∀ Page • pre PageMarkBad
The theorems and abbreviations, related to λ-expressions for bad pages/blocks/luns, are similar to those above for erased
instances.
5.2.2. Marking pages within a block
Once we know how to defect-mark a page, we ‘‘promote’’ it to the defect marking of blocks.
BlockMarkOp =̂ [∆ Block ]
We initialise page addresses (PageAddr) by marking them accordingly as good or bad and associating such page information
with the pages′ the block represents. The addressable page (pa?) chosen is initialised with PageMarkBad or PageMarkErased,
accordingly.
BlockMarkBad =̂ (∃ PageMarkOp; PageAddr? | pa? ∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN •
PageMarkBad ∧ PhiBP)
BlockMarkErased =̂ (∃ PageMarkOp; PageAddr? | PageMarkErased • PhiBP)
We can prove the preconditions of these schema below
theorem tBlockMarkErasedPRE
∀ Block • pre BlockMarkErased
theorem tBlockMarkBadPRE
∀ Block • pre BlockMarkBad
5.2.3. Marking blocks within a logical unit
A LUNmark operation requires a bulk promotion to take place. Again, bulk here in the sense that more than one point of
the local state of pages′ for the Block is being updated within the global state of blocks for the LUN , where the points are all
those within bas?.
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PhiBulkLB
∆ LUN; Block′; bas? : P blockAddr
blocks′ = blocks⊕ { ba : bas? • (ba, pages′) }
Wemust have the format above for constant lambda function automation, as the alternative, { ba : blockAddr | ba ∈ bas? •
ba 7→ pages′ }, is much harder to prove.
At the LUN level we are finally in a position to provide a input badBA? that describes the blocks found to be bad. We need
a further invariant stating that good blocks (i.e., all those blocks addressed outside badBA?) have no zeroed column in any
page. That is important, otherwise we could wrongly confuse good blocks with bad. This is an interesting invariant since,
although quite obvious, it only appeared during precondition proofs, and is not mentioned in ONFi.
LUNMarkSig
LUN; badBA? : P blockAddr
∀DataAddr; Block; Page |
pages = blocks ba ∧
info = pages pa ∧
ba /∈ badBA? •
info ca 6= zeroed
We then define schemas to assist in the description of marking bad blocks in LUNS. It took a degree of experimentation
to establish the best schema layer to declare the badBA? input. So we we developed a general marking schema, with the
declaration signature separate, so keeping changes to a minimum, in particular minimising changes to proof scripts.
LUNMarkOp =̂ [∆LUN; badBA? : P blockAddr ]
We then capture that the page-register is not affected by such bad-block marking, because it is not implemented with the
kind of floating-gate technology that is prone to the kind of defect currently under consideration.
LUNMark0
LUNMarkOp
LUNMarkSig
(∃ PageMarkOp | PageMarkErased • PR′.info = info′ ∧ PR.info = info)
Finally, blocks in badBA? are marked as bad, whilst the rest are erased:
LUNMarkBad
LUNMark0
(∃ BlockMarkOp • BlockMarkBad ∧ PhiBulkLB[badBA?/bas?])
LUNMarkErased
LUNMark0
(∃ BlockMarkOp • BlockMarkErased ∧ PhiBulkLB[bas? := blockAddr \ badBA?])
The preconditions for these have also been successfully proven, but we omit further details.
5.2.4. Marking logical units within a target
To do defect marking at the target level we need to supply a relation badLBA? between LUN and block addresses:
TargetMarkOp =̂ [∆Target; badLBA? : lunAddr ↔ blockAddr ]
We can then define the bulk promotion of LUN blocks within a target.
PhiBulkTL
∆ Target; LUN ′
luns′ = luns⊕ { la : lunAddr • (la, θLUN ′) }
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TargetMark
TargetMarkOp
luns′ = luns⊕ (λ la : {x : lunAddr | x ∈ dom badLBA? } •
(∃ LUNMarkOp | badBA? = badLBA?(| { la } |) • LUNMarkBad))
∪
(λ la : {x : lunAddr | ¬ x ∈ dom badLBA? } •
(∃ LUNMarkOp | badBA? = {} • LUNMarkErased)
Despite the above override covering the whole of lunAddr , and hence being a total function, unfortunately this format is not
helpful to use lambda abstraction rules about constant functions. Instead, to prove this precondition we need to explicitly
show that such set is indeed (partial) functional.
luns′ = luns⊕ { la : lunAddr; LUN ′ |
if (la ∈ dom badLBA?) then
(∃ LUNMarkOp | badBA? = badLBA?(| { la } |) • LUNMarkBad)
else
(∃ LUNMarkOp | badBA? = {} • LUNMarkErased) }
This complicates the proof considerably. To avoid that, we rewrite the predicate above as a λ-expression:
TargetMarkSig =̂ [ Target; badLBA? : lunAddr ↔ blockAddr ]
which is similar to TargetMarkOp, but without the after-state
5.2.5. Marking targets within a NAND flash device
Finally, we get to the level where we can describe defect marking at the device level, here given an input badTLBA?
relating target-ids to bad LUN/block address pairs:
NANDFlashMarkOp
ShippedNANDFlash
badTLBA? : targetIds↔ (lunAddr × blockAddr)
badTLBA? ∈ F (Z× (Z× Z))
and the corresponding bulk promotion:
PhiBulkDT
ShippedNANDFlash; Target ′
targets′ = targets⊕ { tid : targetIds • (tid, luns′) }
As the bad blocks within the ShippedNANDFlash device are finite due to its limit on the number of allowed bad blocks, we
also need to add the constraint that our table of bad blocks is finite. We define the signature as:
NANDFlashMarkSig
NANDFlashDevice
badTLBA? : targetIds↔ (lunAddr × blockAddr)
badTLBA? ∈ F (Z× (Z× Z))
# badTLBA? ≤ maxBadBlocksShipped
and the defect marking operation itself:
NANDFlashMark
NANDFlashMarkOp
badBlocks′ = badTLBA?
∀ TargetIds? •
(∃ TargetMarkOp | badLBA? = badTLBA?(| { tid? } |) • TargetMark ∧ PhiDT )
At last, we state the precondition for the device level marking operation:
theorem tNANDFlashMarkPRE
∀NANDFlashMarkSig • pre NANDFlashMark
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5.3. Comparison against the original model
The originalmodel as presented in [4] described the state of a shipped devicewith bad blocksmarked using the following
two schemas:
ShipFlash
∆NANDFlash
quality? : N
badblocks? : F(TgtId× LUNAddr × BlkAddr)
#badblocks? ≤ maxbad′
maxbad′ = quality?
∀ t : TgtId; ` : LUNAddr; b : BlkAddr •
if (t, `, b) ∈ badblocks?
then defectMarked(device′, t, `, b)
else (device′(t)(`)).blks(b) = erasedBlk
A defective page is indicated by having a zeroed data item somewhere in the spare area of its first or last page:
defectMarked
NANDFlash
∃ p : PageAddr; c : ColAddr • (p = 0 ∨ p = pagesperblock− 1)
∧ c ≥ pagecount
∧ (dev(t)(l)).blks(b)(p)(c) = zeroed
In this model, entire addresses were built up as products of the various components: row, page, block, LUN and target, and
the device was effectively modelled as as a curried mapping from these address components to state values. However, as
automation using Z/Eves proceeded, it became clear that this structure, deeply nested in the way that it was, made the proof
process very cumbersome, mainly because of the continual need to expand and unpack parts of the model in order to carry
out proofs.
The solution, described in this paper, was to extensively re-factor the model, making use of schemas (and particularly
schema conjunction) and promotion to capture the hierarchical structure of both the state and the address spaces.
6. Future work
This is still only early work and there is a lot more to be done. Formal models will be needed to capture the fact that
individual targets within a device can be operating concurrently, with interleaving of data-transfers. Also, the behaviour of
these devices is described in the specification document using two finite-state machines, one for target behaviour, the other
for LUN activity. Amodel of these needs to be shown as a refinement of the abstract operationmodel presented in this paper.
This requires that the existing operators need to be expressed in terms of basic host/device communication actions, which
transfer a single item of information, such as a command, address or data byte/word. The model needs to be extended to
cover the non-mandatory operations of the standard, many of which provide improved performance, via various forms of
caching and interleaving. It is to be anticipated that any file store will make extensive use of these in order to meet mission
performance targets. In many cases a useful model of these will require that the operations are broken down to a smaller
granularity.
NAND flash devices are prone to the unrecoverable failure of blocks over time, through what basically amounts to an
ageing process, that is strongly workload related. This requires so-called ‘‘wear-levelling’’ algorithms tominimise the failure
rate, aswell as some form of fault tolerance to copewith the failures that do occur. This requires us tomodel failure properly,
with a particular emphasis on the fact that such failures have a persistent and lasting effect.
We also need to look upwards (in an abstract sense) from the NAND devices to model how they are used to give an
illusion of ideal behaviour. Whilst the spare area associated with each data page is there to assist with error detection and
recovery, the flash devices themselves have no fault-tolerant mechanisms built-in. Instead the devices have to be interfaced
to a controller that manages the faults, and presents a fault-free model of data storage to the level above. A good overview
of these issues is [8], which surveys algorithms for flash memory, and will be a key reference for developing models of the
file store software levels closest to the hardware.
7. Conclusions
We have described the process of automating part of a hand-crafted Z model of NAND flash memory, using the Z/Eves
theorem prover. The mechanised model described here covers the modelling of the NAND flash memory device structure,
quite complex in itself, and describing an initialisation operation that characterises the way any real device has bad blocks,
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scattered at random, but marked by the manufacturer in a certain way. Modelling the patternless nature of this marking
proved to be quite a challenge, with the need to explore new forms of promotion.
The key lessons learnt here have been the need to both (i) understand the Z idioms thatwork bestwith that prover and (ii)
to build up a collection of theorems and lemmas tailored to the proofs that are required, both by the formal methodology
involved, as well as the nature and structure of the model. Examples of the former are the use of schema conjunction to
describe compound address structures, rather than nested products. For the latter, a series of theorems were required to
deal with the issue of maximal types in Z — Z only has the integers as a basic type, so any variable constrained to belong
to a defined subset of the integers, ultimately has to be described as being of integer type, with an associated (invariant)
predicate.
However, there is an interaction between these two key lessons: the preference for schema conjunction over nested
products relies on the following two observations: First, the schema calculus is an integral part of the Z language and
methodology, so it is not surprising that it is well supported by the prover. Secondly, the difficulty in using nested product
arose largely due to the lack of useful theorems about pairs, triples, pairs of pairs, etc., in the mathematical toolkit supplied
with Z/Eves. The issue highlighted by these observations is that the usability of a theorem prover is determined by the
collection of pre-packaged theorems and lemma with which it is supplied, plus any extra material added in by users. The
key point to take home is that different tools, even if all based on first-order predicate calculus (say), may be quite different
in their ability to prove any given theorem.
We draw some more general lessons from all of these observations. The success of mechanising formal models will
encourage an approach where models are built hand-in-hand with a tool, rather than following the ‘‘handcraft-then-
mechanise’’ approachusedhere.Modellerswill need to be familiarwith the idiomsbest suited to these tools. Also, in building
a repository of verified software (with hardware models as well), there will inevitably develop an interest in using different
provers/formalisms to model the same thing, or to build a large system from various components, each developed with a
different formalism or prover. Even if the various tools have the same or similar underlying logic, and same or similar type
systems, the different idioms used for the various tools could present a barrier to success.We anticipate that getting effective
interoperability across various mechanised reasoning platforms will require some ‘‘standardisation’’ of the idioms used.
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Appendix A. Exponentiation
We define an auxiliary function used to compute exponentiation of positive natural numbers inductively.
power : (N1 × N)→ N1
〈〈disabled rule dPowerBase 〉〉 ∀ b : N1 • power (b, 0) = 1
〈〈disabled rule dPowerInduc 〉〉 ∀ base, exp : N1 • power (base, exp) = base ∗ power (base, (exp− 1))
We need to prove this operation is satisfiable:
proof[power$domainCheck]
prove by reduce;
The following theorem assists in its use:
theorem disabled rule lPower
∀ base : N1; exp : N • power (base, exp) =
if exp = 0 then 1 else base ∗ power (base, (exp− 1))
We prove its domain is OK:
proof[lPower]
with enabled (dPowerBase, dPowerInduc) prove by reduce;
We need the above definitions and rules to show that the page count is consistent:
theorem tPageCountConsistency
∃ pCnt, paSize : N1 • pCnt = power (2, paSize)
234 A. Butterfield et al. / Science of Computer Programming 74 (2009) 219–237
proof[tPageCountConsistency]
instantiate pCnt == power (2, 1), paSize == 1;
with enabled (dPowerInduc, dPowerBase) prove by rewrite;
We also need it for the spare range consistency theorem:
theorem tSpareRangeConsistency
∃ paSize, caSize, s : N1 • power (2, paSize)+ s ≤ power (2, caSize)
proof[tSpareRangeConsistency]
instantiate paSize == 1, caSize == 2, s == 1;
prove by rewrite;
with enabled (dPowerInduc, dPowerBase) prove by rewrite;
Appendix B. Proofs
We present here a selection of some of the theorems proved, and their proofs.
theorem grule gDataIsDatum
d ∈ Data⇒ d ∈ Datum
proof[gDataIsDatum]
prove by reduce;
theorem tColAddrConsistency
∃ ca : F1 N • ca = 0 . . pageCount + spare− 1
proof[tColAddrConsistency]
prove by rewrite;
apply extensionality;
prove by rewrite;
instantiate x == 0;
prove by rewrite;
use pageCount$declaration;
use spare$declaration;
apply inNat1;
rewrite;
theorem grule gColAddrMaxType
x ∈ colAddr ⇒ x ∈ Z
proof[gColAddrMaxType]
prove by reduce;
theorem tExistsColAddr
∃ ca : colAddr • true
proof[tExistsColAddr]
instantiate ca == 0;
apply dColAddr;
prove by rewrite;
use pageCount$declaration;
use spare$declaration;
apply inNat1;
simplify;
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theorem frule tBlockPagesAreTotal
∀ Block • pages ∈ pageAddr → colAddr → Data
proof[tBlockPagesAreTotal]
prove by reduce;
theorem tNANDFlashDeviceInitPRE
∀ quality? : N • pre NANDFlashDeviceInit
proof[tNANDFlashDeviceInitPRE]
prove by reduce;
instantiate targets′ == ERASED TARGET INSTANCE;
prove by reduce;
with enabled (ERASED PAGE INSTANCE, ERASED BLOCK INSTANCE)
prove by reduce;
theorem tShippedNANDFlashPRE
∀NANDFlashDevice • pre ShippedNANDFlash
proof[tShippedNANDFlashPRE]
instantiate targets′ == targets, badBlocks′ == badBlocks,
maxBadBlocksShipped′ == maxBadBlocksShipped;
prove by reduce;
theorem grule gBadColAddrDomainMaxType
BAD COLADDR DOMAIN ∈ PZ
proof[gBadColAddrDomainMaxType]
with enabled (BAD COLADDR DOMAIN) prove by reduce;
theorem rule rBadColAddrDomainElem
x ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN ⇒ x ≥ pageCount
proof[rBadColAddrDomainElem]
with enabled (BAD COLADDR DOMAIN) prove by reduce;
theorem rule rBadColAddrDomainIsColAddr
x ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN ⇒ x ∈ colAddr
proof[rBadColAddrDomainIsColAddr]
with enabled (BAD COLADDR DOMAIN) prove by reduce;
theorem rule lPageCountInBadColAddrDomain
pageCount ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN
proof[lPageCountInBadColAddrDomain]
use pageCount$declaration;
use spare$declaration;
apply inNat1;
with enabled (BAD COLADDR DOMAIN, dColAddr) prove by reduce;
theorem grule gFirstPageAddrMaxType
FIRST PAGEADDR ∈ Z
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proof[gFirstPageAddrMaxType]
with enabled (FIRST PAGEADDR) prove by reduce;
theorem rule lBadPageAddrDomainElem
FIRST PAGEADDR ∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN
proof[lBadPageAddrDomainElem]
use pagesPerBlock$declaration;
apply inNat1;
with enabled (FIRST PAGEADDR, BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN, dPageAddr)
prove by reduce;
theorem tExistsBadColAddr
∃ ColAddr • ca ∈ BAD COLADDR DOMAIN
proof[tExistsBadColAddr]
instantiate ca == pageCount;
prove by reduce;
theorem tExistsBadPageAddr
∃ PageAddr • pa ∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN
proof[tExistsBadPageAddr]
instantiate pa == FIRST PAGEADDR;
prove by reduce;
theorem tPageAddrDomainBounds
if (pagesPerBlock > 2) then
(∃ PageAddr • pa /∈ BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN)
else
pageAddr = BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN
proof[tPageAddrDomainBounds]
instantiate pa == 1;
with enabled (BAD PAGEADDR DOMAIN, FIRST PAGEADDR, dPageAddr)
prove by reduce;
use pagesPerBlock$declaration;
apply inNat1;
rewrite;
apply extensionality;
prove by rewrite;
theorem tPageMarkBadPRE
∀ Page • pre PageMarkBad
proof[tPageMarkBadPRE]
instantiate info′ == BAD PAGE INSTANCE;
prove by reduce;
instantiate ca == pageCount;
prove by reduce;
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